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PIACITELLI v. SOUTHERN UTAH STATE COLLEGE Utah 1063 
Cite as, Utah, 636 P.2d 1063 
trial court's findings of fact, and those find-
ings are entitled to presumption of correct-
ness and may not be overturned so long as 
they are supported by substantial evidence 
in record. 
James E. PIACITELLI, Plaintiff, Appel-
lant, and Cross-Respondent, 
SOUTHERN UTAH STATE COLLEGE; 
and Orville D. Carnahan, President, 
Southern Utah State College, Defend-
ants, Respondents, and Cross-Appel-
lants. 
No. 17202. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 18, 1981. 
Terminated college coordinator of 
counselling brought action against college 
and its president seeking reinstatement and 
damages for college's alleged violation of 
contractually guaranteed termination pro-
cedures. The Fifth District Court, Iron 
County, Robert F. Owens, J., denied rein-
statement but awarded back pay, and plain-
tiff appealed and college cross appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that: 
(1) there was substantial evidence to sup-
port trial court's finding that substantial 
purpose of the guaranteed termination pro-
cedures were fulfilled, and thus plaintiff 
was not entitled to reinstatement, and (2) 
plaintiff was entitled as a matter of con-
tract law to back pay for period between 
his procedurally defective dismissal and 
subsequent proper dismissal. 
Affirmed. 
1. Colleges and Universities <s=»8.1(l) 
An educational institution may under-
take a contractual obligation to observe 
particular termination formalities by adopt-
ing procedures or by promulgating rules 
and regulations governing the employment 
relationship. 
2. Colleges and Universities e=>8.1(4) 
So long as the substantial interests a 
college's termination procedures are de-
signed to safeguard are in fact satisfied and 
protected, college's failure to conform to 
every technical detail of the procedures is 
not actionable. 
3. Appeal and Error <s=>931(l), 1010.1(6) 
On appeal, Supreme Court must con-
sider all evidence in light most favorable to 
4. Colleges and Universities o=»8.1(6) 
In action brought by terminated col-
lege coordinator of counselling against col-
lege alleging that his termination was not 
in compliance with procedures promulgated 
in college's personnel manual, evidence sup-
ported trial court's finding that substantial 
purpose of requirement of progressive disci-
pline had been fulfilled by the college, and 
thus coordinator was not entitled to rein-
statement. 
5. Colleges and Universities <s=>8.1(7) 
College coordinator of counselling who 
was dismissed with sufficient cause, but in 
violation of contractually guaranteed termi-
nation procedures, was entitled as matter of 
contract law to back pay for period between 
his procedurally defective dismissal and 
subsequent proper dismissal. 
6. Colleges and Universities <3=>8.1(7) 
The tort measure of damages under 
Federal Civil Rights Statute providing for 
civil action for deprivation of rights was 
inapplicable to claim of terminated college 
coordinator of counselling against state col-
lege for reinstatement and for damages 
which was based solely on breach of em-
ployment contract. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
7. Colleges and Universities <s=> 8.1(7) 
Proper measure of damages for a col-
lege employee who has been dismissed with-
out substantial compliance with agreed ter-
mination procedures is proposed salary for 
the appropriate period, less amounts actual-
ly earned by employee during that period or 
amount he reasonably could have earned in 
other available employment of a like na-
ture, and employee is also entitled to statu-
tory interest; where no salary agreement 
has been reached for damage period, rate of 
pay for previous salary year should be used 
as base salary amount. 
8. Colleges and Universities c=>8.1(7) 
Mitigation of damages for a college 
employee who has been dismissed without 
substantial compliance with agreed termi-
nation procedures is an affirmative defense, 
and any amounts in mitigation may be es-
tablished by employer. 
H. Delbert Welker, Salt Lake City, for 
appellant. 
Robert L. Gardner, Cedar City, for re-
spondent. 
OAKS, Justice: 
This is an action by a college employee 
who claims he was terminated without the 
formal termination procedures required by 
his contract. The district court denied rein-
statement but awarded back pay for a peri-
od of approximately six months. The em-
ployee appeals the failure to reinstate him, 
and the College cross-appeals the award of 
back pay. We affirm on both issues. 
In 1973, plaintiff Piacitelli commenced 
employment as Coordinator of Counseling 
at Southern Utah State College (SUSC) 
(hereinafter "the College"). In this posi-
tion, which was categorized as nonfacuity 
"classified staff," he was not eligible for 
tenure like faculty members at the College. 
In each of the academic years beginning 
1973 through 1978, Piacitelli was issued a 
"Notice of Appointment," signed by the 
President of the College and effective "for 
the contract period" of July 1 through June 
30. This document specified Piacitelli's job 
title, department, and salary for the year. 
For each of those years, Piacitelli signed 
and returned a form indicating his accept-
ance of employment for the duration and 
compensation specified. 
Beginning early in his employment, a 
number of conflicts and disagreements 
arose between Piacitelli and his supervisors, 
the Dean and Associate Dean of Students. 
Some of these problems were resolved; oth-
ers were not. In December, 1978, Piacitel-
li's immediate supervisor recommended that 
the College not continue to employ Piacitelli 
as a counselor. In a one-sentence letter 
dated January 24, 1979, the College Presi-
dent informed Piacitelli that his contract 
would "not be renewed at the end of the 
current contract period." In a letter dated 
February 13, 1979, the President advised 
Piacitelli that the College's action was "not 
to be interpreted as 'dismissal for cause,' 
which action, if taken, would result in im-
mediate termination of employment . . . " 
The Dean of Students later explained in an 
affidavit that the administration preferred 
nonrenewal to dismissal for cause "out of 
consideration for his professional future 
and in accordance with higher education 
practices . . . " 
I. THE INITIAL PROCEEDING 
Piacitelli commenced his initial action on 
April 17, 1979, charging that a failure to 
renew his employment contract was, in ef-
fect, a dismissal for cause and as such vio-
lated his "due process rights as set forth in 
the SUSC Personnel Policies and Proce-
dures." Piacitelli asked for declaratory re-
lief, reinstatement, costs and attorney's 
fees, and "such other and further relief as 
the court deems proper." 
In the district court, Piacitelli relied on 
the College's Personnel Policies and Proce-
dures Manual (hereinafter "Personnel Man-
ual"), Section 11-14 of which sets forth for-
mal procedures to be followed in the "dis-
missal" of a classified employee who has 
completed a six-month probationary period. 
Several passages in the Personnel Manual 
seem to suggest that all employees are ei-
ther probationary (terminable at will) or 
permanent (terminable only after compli-
ance with specified procedures). Conse-
quently, Piacitelli argued, by not renewing 
a "permanent" employee's contract the Col-
lege was attempting to circumvent its own 
procedures and accomplish indirectly what 
its Personnel Manual prevented it from ac-
complishing directly. 
The College conceded that Piacitelli was a 
classified employee and that he was not 
probationary. However, it contended that 
Piacitelli was employed on a year-to-year 
basis; that his contract expired by its own 
terms in June, 1979; and that he was not 
dismissed at all, but simply not rehired. 
Therefore, the College concluded, its formal 
termination procedures did not apply. 
Those procedures would have applied, ac-
cording to the College, only if Piacitelli had 
been dismissed before the expiration of the 
annual contract period. The College fur-
ther argued that to equate nonrenewal with 
dismissal would, in effect, grant tenure sta-
the fact that this status is not conferred on 
all of the faculty.1 
In January, 1980, the district court ruled 
that the College's Personnel Manual gov-
erned the terms of Piacitelli's employment 
contract with the College, that Piacitelli 
had acquired "permanent employment sta-
tus" under that contract, and that the Col-
lege's failure to renew Piacitelli's annual 
employment contract without complying 
"with due process of law requirements pur-
suant to [the Personnel Manual] . . . consti-
tuted plaintiff's termination and thus a 
breach of contract." The district court 
thereupon ordered the College to grant Pia-
citelli "administrative due process proce-
dure pursuant to the [Personnel Manual]." 
This was a final order, which, unless re-
versed on appeal, is res judicata and bind-
ing upon these parties. Bradshaw v. Ker-
shaw, Utah, 627 P.2d 528 (1981); Federated 
Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, U.S. 
, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981). 
The order was not appealed. Consequently, 
for purposes of this case, we must treat 
Piacitelli as an employee with permanent 
employment status whose employment con-
tract entitled him to the formal procedures 
specified in the Personnel Manual before he 
could be dismissed or terminated, even at 
the conclusion of the annual contract peri-
od.2 
II. THE DISMISSAL AND SUBSE-
QUENT PROCEEDING 
On February 8, 1980, the College Person-
nel Director issued a formal notice of dis-
1. For the reasons stated hereafter, this question 
is not before us in this case and we express no 
opinion on it. 
2. We intimate no agreement or disagreement 
with the district court's construction of Piaci-
telli's employment status or with its conclusion 
on the rights of classified College employees 
receiving annual notices of appointment. The 
fact that the question is res judicata settles 
those questions for these litigants and this case 
only. 
3. The first appeal was to the Employee Dis-
missal Review Committee, a group consisting 
of six College employees, which held a one and 
one-half day hearing at which Piacitelli was 
represented by a representative of the Utah 
ngni u> appeal, nacitelli pursued his ap-
peal through three college appellate author-
ities,3 all of which upheld the dismissal. 
Piacitelli then took the controversy back 
to the district court, which on June 2, 1980, 
issued an order to show cause why the 
College should not be held in contempt of 
court or reinstate Piacitelli to his former 
position and pay him back wages. After a 
hearing on this order, the district court 
ruled that the College had substantially 
complied with its procedures, that Piacitelli 
was rightfully terminated as of February 8, 
1980, that there were no grounds for order-
ing the College to reinstate him, and that 
he was entitled to back pay for the period 
July 1, 1979, through February 8, 1980. 
III. REINSTATEMENT FOR 
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH 
PERSONNEL MANUAL 
Piacitelli's sole argument on appeal is 
that the district court should have ordered 
him reinstated because, contrary to the 
court's conclusion, the College had not ade-
quately complied with the contractual ter-
mination procedures contained in its Per-
sonnel Manual.4 This argument is based 
entirely on sections of the Personnel Manu-
al that provide for "progressive discipline," 
the imposition of increasingly severe sanc-
tions before dismissal. Section 11-14 of the 
Manual outlines four steps of progressive 
discipline: (1) oral warning, (2) written 
Public Employees Association. The Committee 
recommended to the College's President that 
the dismissal be sustained. Piacitelli appealed 
this decision to the President, who sustained 
the Committee's decision. Piacitelli then ap-
pealed to the Institutional Council, which un-
dertook a full-dress review of the hearing. The 
Institutional Council, with nine of ten members 
present, unanimously upheld the President's 
decision and the recommendation of the Dis-
missal Review Committee. 
4. See generally, Duerr, "Annotation: Reinstate-
ment as a Remedy in Cases Involving Termina-
tion of Tenured Faculty," 7 J. of Coll. & U.L. 57 
(1981). 
warning, (3) suspension, and (4) dismissal. 
We need not decide whether the College 
was obligated to follow the progressive dis-
cipline requirements of the Personnel Man-
ual on the facts of this case because we 
agree with the district court's finding that 
the College's actions constituted substantial 
compliance with those requirements in any 
event. 
[1] We underline at the outset the dis-
trict court's finding, which is now binding 
in this case, that the terms of Piacitelii's 
employment were governed by the College's 
Personnel Manual. This finding comports 
with the numerous holdings that an educa-
tional institution may undertake a contrac-
tual obligation to observe particular termi-
nation formalities by adopting procedures 
or by promulgating rules and regulations 
governing the employment relationship. 
Greene v. Howard University, 412 F.2d 1128 
(D.C.Cir.1969); Decker v. Worcester Junior 
College, 369 Mass. 960, 336 N.E.2d 909 
(1975); Hillis v. Meister, 82 N.M. 474, 483 
P.2d 1314 (1971); Zimmerman v. Minot 
State College, N.D., 198 N.W.2d 108 (1972).5 
We are, therefore, construing a contract, 
not declaring statutory or constitutional 
rights. 
The College's Personnel Manual states 
that "generally there is a required correc-
tive action," which the manual refers to as 
"progressive discipline," which "may result 
in dismissal or suspension unless there is a 
major, serious, or aggravated act of miscon-
duct which requires immediate action." 
Personnel Manual, 11-14, p. 2. The Manual 
also provides that progressive discipline 
should be "corrective whenever possible, 
5. The existence of such a contractual obligation 
does not preclude an employer's changing cur-
rent procedures and regulations according to 
existing practices and procedures for amend-
ment. Thus, it has been held that an employ-
er's policy manual may give nse to employee 
contractual rights even where it "can be unilat-
erally amended by the employer without notice 
to the employee " Toussaint v. Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 615, 292 
N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980) (non-educational em-
ployer). See also, Knowles v. Unity College, 
Me., 429 A^d 220 (1981). 
In the absence of a contractually based obli-
gation for continued employment or mandatory 
rather than punitive," should concentrate 
on "preventing serious personnel problems 
from occurring," and "should never involve 
the element of surprise to the employee." 
Id. at pp. 2 and 5. The Manual also states 
that "[t]he 'progressive discipline' process 
used in appropriate circumstances is a fol-
low-through method to ensure that infrac-
tions, misconduct, or unacceptable perform-
ance is treated in a manner that will elimi-
nate, correct, or resolve such actions or 
practices, if possible." Id. at p. 5. It is 
clear from these statements that the pur-
pose of the progressive discipline approach 
is to prevent major acts of misconduct by 
giving the employee an early warning of 
the possible consequences of his persisting 
in unacceptable behavior. 
[2] Circuit Judge Owens, sitting by des-
ignation after the initial proceeding in the 
district court, ruled that substantial compli-
ance with the procedural requirements of 
the Personnel Manual was sufficient so long 
as it answered the purpose of those require-
ments: 
If the purpose [of progressive discipline] 
was attained through other means than 
by strict adherence to the letter of the 
manual, then this should not be deemed a 
breach of the contract. 
We agree. Because the purpose of the pro-
cedural requirements was fulfilled and the 
substantial interests of the parties were 
satisfied, we see no merit in requiring strict 
or literal compliance with the prescribed 
procedures in this case. This employment 
contract between a college and a counselor 
formalized a relationship of mutual trust 
termination procedures, many courts have held 
that an educational institution may, with prop-
er notice, choose not to renew a nontenured 
employee's contract for no reason or for any 
reason other than a few constitutionally imper-
missible ones. Hickmgbottom v. Easley, 494 
F.Supp. 980 (ED.Ark.1980); Cooper v. Ross, 
472 F.Supp. 802 (E.D.Ark.1979), Kota v. Uttle, 
351 F.Supp. 1059 (E.D.N.C1971), afTd 473 F.2d 
1 (1973); Nance v. Oregon State System of 
Higher Ed., 23 Or.App. 558, 543 P.2d 687 
(1975), cert, denied 429 U.S. 827, 97 S.Ct. 84, 50 
L.Ed.2d 90 (1876). See also, Bd. of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 
548 (1972). 
sides should be measured by the substance 
of the relationship, not by its technical de-
tails While exact conformance with the 
precise terms of the termination procedures 
is doubtless the least controversial course, 
so long as the substantial interests those 
procedures are designed to safeguard are in 
fact satisfied and protected, failure to con-
form to every technical detail of the termi-
nation procedure is not actionable Carr v 
Board of Trustees, 465 F Supp 886 (N D 
Ohio 1979) (alternative ground) 
Was the substantial purpose of the re-
quirement of progressive discipline fulfilled 
in the circumstances of this case7 The dis-
trict court found as follows 
A review of affidavits on both sides dis-
closes quite clearly that (1) Plaintiff was 
advised, directly or by inference, of his 
unacceptable conduct repeatedly over a 
period of years, and (2) that he resisted 
conforming This Court further finds 
that this history substantially fulfilled 
the corrective purposes of the Personnel 
Manual, and was the effective equivalent 
of the oral warning-written warning-sus-
pension-dismissal procedure set forth in 
Section D of the Manual 
[3,4] On appeal, this Court must con-
sider all evidence in the light most favor-
able to the trial court's findings of fact 
Those findings are entitled to a presump-
tion of correctness and may not be over-
turned so long as they are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record R C 
Tolman Construction Co v Myton Water 
Ass'n, Utah, 563 P2d 780 (1977), Child v 
Hayward, 16 Utah 2d 351, 400 P 2d 758 
(1965), Charlton v Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 
389, 360 P 2d 176 (1961) After reviewing 
the affidavits and the other material in the 
6 The first question is settled by the principle of 
res judicata discussed earlier The second 
question is settled by the fact that Piacitelh's 
dismissal on February 8 1980, which this Court 
has now sustained was based entirely on con-
duct he had engaged in pnor to receiving notice 
of nonrenewal Thus if Piacitelh had been 
accorded full termination procedures in Janu-
standmg In his numerous interviews with 
his superiors, he was given ample notice 
that his job was in jeopardy because of 
specified deficiencies in his performance 
WTe therefore sustain the district court's 
conclusion that the College substantially 
complied with the contract requirement of 
progressive discipline 
Piacitelh made no other challenge to the 
district court's conclusion that he was right-
fully terminated as of February 8, 1980 
The judgment denying him reinstatement is 
therefore affirmed 
IV LIABILITY FOR BACK PAY 
The College cross-appeals the district 
court's ruling that Piacitelh should receive 
back pa> for the period from June 30, 1979, 
when the College ceased to pay him, 
through Februan 8, 1980, when he was 
properly terminated 
[5] For purposes of this cross-appeal, we 
must consider two questions settled First, 
the nonrenewal of Piacitelh's contract on 
June 30, 1979, was procedurally defective 
because it was accomplished in violation of 
his contractual right to formal termination 
procedures Second, the College had just 
cause to dismiss Piacitelh6 Consequently, 
the back pay issue may be framed as fol-
lows Is a college employee who was dis-
missed with sufficient cause, but in viola-
tion of contractually guaranteed termina-
tion procedures, entitled as a matter of 
contract law to back pay for the period 
between the procedurally defective dismiss-
al and the subsequent proper dismissal77 
We hold in the affirmative, and affirm the 
district court on the cross-appeal 
ary, 1979 he could and probably would have 
been terminated at that time 
7. This is not a case where the terms of the 
contract could be satisfied by a hearing after 
the dismissal Compare the contract construed 
in Lilhe \ Commerce Citv Kindergarten, Inc, 
29 Colo App 553, 487 P 2d 605 (1971) 
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[6] Numerous state and federal courts 
have considered the propriety of back pay 
awards after justified but procedurally de-
ficient dismissals. But, unlike the instant 
case, the appellate opinions in the decided 
cases have not rested primarily on contract 
theory. In all but one of those cases,8 the 
employees' claims have been founded upon 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a federal 
damage remedy against one wTho, under col-
or of state law, deprives the plaintiff "of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws . . . ." 
The right claimed in those cases is the 
Fourteenth Amendment right not to be de-
prived of property without due process of 
law. The property at stake in each case is 
the plaintiff's contractual expectation of 
continued employment. In the § 1983 
cases, the employment contract ordinarily 
appears only as a spoke in a larger constitu-
tional and statutory wheel. 
Back pay has normally been denied in 
these constitutionally based § 1983 cases on 
the rationale that the wrong suffered by 
the employee was not the dismissal. (Good 
cause being present, the employee would 
have been dismissed even if the required 
procedures had been followed.) The wrong 
was the deprivation of due process. Conse-
quently, the plaintiff is not allowed to re-
cover back pay, which is the normal remedy 
to compensate an employee dismissed with-
out cause, but can recover only those dam-
ages directly traceable to the employer's 
failure to observe due process, viz., nominal 
damages and, in most cases, provable dam-
ages for mental and emotional distress. 
Taliaferro v. Willett, 588 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 
8. See Nzomo v. Vermont State Colleges, 138 
Vt. 73, 411 A.2d 1366 (1980), a contract case 
which relies on the § 1983 precedents. 
9. In cases the Supreme Court cited and disap-
proved, 435 U.S. at 260, n. 15, 98 S.Ct. at 1050, 
n. 15, Courts of Appeal in the Fourth and Fifth 
Circuits had granted back pay in § 1983 ac-
tions, reasoning that a termination without the 
legally required procedures was a nullity and 
consequently that the employee continued to 
be entitled to the benefits of the employment 
relation until he was dismissed with the proper 
formality. Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916 (4th 
Cir. 1975); Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176 
1978); Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 
1978); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College 
District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 
1975), cert, denied 425 U.S. 963, 96 S.Ct. 
1748, 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976); Parks v. Goff, 
483 F.Supp. 502 (E.D.Ark. 1980); Ohland v. 
City of Montpelier, 467 F.Supp. 324 (D.Vt. 
1979). 
The United States Supreme Court ap-
proved and applied this same measure of 
damages to the closely analogous case of 
the § 1983 damage claims of public school 
students suspended without the required 
due process procedures. Carey v. Piphus, 
435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 
(1978). In doing so, the Court specifically 
rejected the reasoning of federal cases that 
had granted back pay to employees dis-
missed for cause but without due process.9 
Its opinion gave an extended explanation of 
the rationale of damages under § 1983. 
The Court characterized this statutory 
cause of action as a "species of tort liabili-
ty." Id. at 253, 98 S.Ct. at 1047, quoting 
Imbler v. Pachtman, A2A U.S. 409, 417, 96 
S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Since tort 
damages are designed to compensate the 
plaintiff for an injury caused by the de-
fendant, the Court approved the principle 
that "the basic purpose of a § 1983 damages 
award should be to compensate persons for 
injuries caused by the deprivation of consti-
tutional rights " Id. at 254, 98 S.Ct. at 
1047. This principle excluded "presumed 
damages" or damages for injuries caused by 
justified suspensions. Plaintiffs were limits 
ed to damages proved to have been caused 
by the denial of procedural due process.10 
(5th Cir. 1973); Morton v. Orange County Bd. 
of Ed, 464 F.2d 536 (4th Cir. 1972). 
10. Other courts have applied this rationale in 
decisions based directly on the U. S. Constitu-
tion. These courts analogized to Carey or 
some other § 1983 case. Kendall v. Bd. of Ed.% 
627 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1980); Unified School Dist. 
No. 480 v. Epperson, 551 F.2d 254 (10th Cir. 
1977); Bowler v. Bd. of Trustees, 101 Idaho 
537, 617 P.2d 841 (1980). But see Wertz v. So. 
Cloud Unified School Dist. No. 344, 218 Kan. 
25, 542 P.2d 339 (1975), in which a contrary 
result was reached in a pre-Carey constitution-
al case. 
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Cite as, Utah, 
The § 1983 authorities are not persuasive 
on the measure of damages that should be 
applied to a claim like Piacitelli's, which is 
based solely on a breach of the employment 
contract. 
In the tort context, neither party has any 
underlying, continuing obligation to pay 
money to the other. Rather, the law seeks 
to compensate one party for an injury 
caused by a specific tortious act. The right 
to that compensation depends on a causal 
chain connecting defendant's wrongful act 
with plaintiff's injury. This approach dic-
tates that an employee discharged with suf-
ficient cause but in violation of his proce-
dural due process rights is only entitled to 
the damages he can prove were caused by 
defendant's wrong. Since defendant's 
wrongful act was not the dismissal per se 
but the failure to observe due process, only 
damages flowing directly from the failure 
to observe the required procedures are 
recoverable. 
This outcome contrasts with the outcome 
produced by analyzing the same problem 
from the standpoint of breach of contract. 
By entering into an employment contract of 
the type before us, the parties assume con-
tinuing obligations to one another: the em-
ployee to render services, the employer to 
pay salary. Those obligations continue un-
til they are extinguished. Here, the termi-
nation mechanism described in the Person-
nel Manual, which the district court found 
to govern the terms of the contract be-
tween the College and its employee, was the 
sole means by which the College could ex-
tinguish the contractual relationship. Until 
it at least substantially complied with those 
procedures, its contractual obligation con-
tinued in force and the clock continued to 
run on Piacitelli's right to receive his con-
tract salary.11 Piacitelli is therefore enti-
tled to recover that accrued salary, and is 
not limited to reimbursement for an injury 
caused by a specific wrongful act. 
11 An employee's right to compensation is of 
course subject to termination for failure to ren-
der his own agreed performance. That sort of 
failure is not at issue here since Piacitelli's 
performance was excused by the College's pre-
vention. See Fischer v. Johnson, Utah, 525 
P.2d 45 (1974). 
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This result comports with what we deem 
to be sound policy for contractual employer-
employee relations. It will encourage em-
ployers to comply promptly with their con-
tractual termination procedures, and if they 
fail to do so will impose the monetary con-
sequences on the party at fault. If the rule 
were otherwise, the employer could dis-
charge an employee summarily and then 
omit or delay the contractual termination 
procedures with impunity so long as it was 
in possession of evidence which, when ulti-
mately provided, would justify the dis-
charge. In that circumstance, the employ-
ee, without notice of the reason for his 
dismissal and without any opportunity to 
refute the charges, would remain in an in-
definite and painful state of limbo, uncer-
tain about his ultimate right to reinstate-
ment or back pay. If our rule works any 
hardship on employers, they can avoid it by 
prompt and substantial compliance with the 
procedures to which they have agreed. 
[7,8] The proper measure of damages 
for an employee who has been dismissed 
without substantial compliance with agreed 
termination procedures is the promised sala-
ry for the appropriate period, less amounts 
actually earned by the employee during 
that period or amounts he reasonably could 
have earned in other available employment 
of a like nature. Pratt v. Board of Educa-
tion, Utah, 564 P.2d 294, 298 (1977); Willi-
ston on Contracts, Vol. 11, §§ 1358-1360 (3d 
ed. 1968); Annot., "Elements and Measure 
of Damages in Action by Schoolteacher for 
Wrongful Discharge/' 22 A.L.R.3d 1047 
(1968).12 The employee is also entitled to 
interest at the statutory rate as specified in 
U.C.A., 1953, § 15-1-1. PapadopouJos v. 
Oregon State Board of Higher Education, 
48 Or.App. 739, 617 P.2d 931 (1980). Miti-
gation of damages is an affirmative de-
12. It has also been held that the court may 
reduce a back pay award where the plaintiff 
teacher, after diligent search for other employ-
ment, pursued a doctoral degree at a universi-
ty. Boatright v. Bd. of Trustees, 225 Kan. 327, 
590 P.2d 1032 (1979). 
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fease, and any amounts in mitigation must 
be established by the employer. Pratt v. 
Board of Education, supra. Where no sala-
ry agreement has been reached for the 
damage period, the rate of pay for the 
previous salary year should be used as the 
base salary amount. Brady v. Board of 
Trustees, 196 Neb. 226, 242 N.W.2d 616 
(1976). 
In sum, we hold that, where the College 
breached its contract with this employee by 
originally discharging him without observ-
ing the formal termination procedures in 
the College Personnel Manual, (1) even 
though the College had good cause to dis-
miss the employee, it was under a contrac-
tual obligation to continue to pay his salary 
until he was properly dismissed; and (2) the 
College finally performed a proper dismissal 
by substantially complying with the proce-
dures in its Personnel Manual and therefore 
is not obliged to reinstate the employee. 
The judgment is affirmed. No costs 
awarded. 
HALL, C. J., and STEWART and HOWE, 
JJ., concur. 
MAUGHAN, J., heard the arguments, 
but died before the opinion was filed. 
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LINDON CITY, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v 
ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTION CO., a 
corporation, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No, 17141 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 21, 1981. 
City brought action against contractor 
for declaratory judgment as to rights and 
obligations of litigants. The Fourth Dis-
trict Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, 
J., dismissed, and city appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Hall, C. J., held that: (1) 
under provisions of contract, city was re-
quired to arbitrate prior to litigating dis-
putes; (2) questions as to the interest rate 
on delinquent payments and whether there 
had been final payment by check which did 
not include disputed interest were arbitra-
ble; (3) Arbitration Act did not violate pub-
lic policy; (4) Act does not deprive the city 
of due process or its remedy by due course 
of law; and (5) Act as applied to city was 
not an unconstitutional delegation of a mu-
nicipal function to a special commission. 
Affirmed. 
1. Arbitration <s=>7.5 
Question of whether final payment had 
been made under contract when the amount 
paid did not include disputed interest and 
question as to the rate of interest on delin-
quent contract payments were "disputes" 
subject to arbitration under provision of 
contract providing that all claims, disputes 
and other matters in question arising out of 
or relating to the contract documents or 
breach thereof should be arbitrated, except 
claims which had been waived by the mak-
ing and acceptance of final payment. 
2. Arbitration <s=>9 
Under contract calling for arbitration 
of all disputes, city was required to seek 
arbitration before bringing suit under the 
Arbitration Act or the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act. U.C.A.1953, 78-31-1 et seq., 7fr-
33-1 et seq. 
3 Arbitration <s=>7.1 
Doubts as to whether the content of a 
contract is arbitrable should be resolved in 
favor of the parties' freedom to contract. 
4. Declaratory Judgment <&»24 
Purpose of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act is to permit examination of legal docu-
ments and statutes to determine questions 
if construction or validity arising under 
such instruments, U C.A.1953, 78-33-1 et 
seq. 
